DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2020-0345; Product Identifier 2019-NM-154-AD; Amendment
39-21951; AD 2022-04-09]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; AVOX System Inc. (Formerly Scott
Aviation) Oxygen Cylinder and Valve Assemblies and Oxygen Valve
Assemblies
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD)
for
certain AVOX System Inc. (formerly Scott Aviation) oxygen cylinder and
valve assemblies, and oxygen valve assemblies, installed on but not
limited to various transport airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports
of cylinder and valve assemblies having oxygen leakage from the valve
assembly vent hole, caused by the absence of a guide that maintains
appropriate spacing between certain parts. This AD requires an
inspection of the oxygen valve assemblies, and oxygen cylinder and
valve assemblies, to determine the serial number of the valve,
cylinder, and entire assembly. For assemblies and parts with certain
serial numbers, this AD requires a detailed inspection for correct
spacing of the gap between the bottom of the packing retainer and top
of the valve body on the assemblies, and replacement of assemblies
having unacceptable gaps. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective April 4, 2022.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of April 4,
2022.
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule,
contact AVOX Systems Inc., 225 Erie Street, Lancaster, NY 14086;
telephone 716-683-5100; internet https://www.safranaerosystems.com. You
may view this service information at the FAA, Airworthiness Products
Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines,
WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA,
call 206-231-3195. It is also available at https://www.regulations.gov
by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0345.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0345; or in person at
Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any
comments received, and other information. The address for Docket
Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE, Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth Dowling, Aerospace Engineer,
Mechanical Systems and Administrative Services Section, FAA, New York
ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590;
telephone 516-228-7300; email 9-avs-nyaco-cos@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain AVOX System
Inc. (formerly Scott Aviation) oxygen cylinder and valve assemblies,
and oxygen valve assemblies, installed on but not limited to various
transport airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on May
1, 2020 (85 FR 25353). The NPRM was prompted by reports of cylinder and
valve assemblies having oxygen leakage from the valve assembly vent
hole, caused by the absence of a guide that maintains appropriate
spacing between certain parts. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require
an inspection of the oxygen valve assemblies, and oxygen cylinder and
valve assemblies, to determine the serial number of the valve,
cylinder, and entire assembly. For assemblies and parts with certain
serial numbers, the NPRM proposed to require a detailed inspection for
correct spacing of the gap between the bottom of the packing retainer
and top of the valve body on the assemblies, and replacement of
assemblies having unacceptable gaps (removing affected assemblies and
installing serviceable assemblies). The NPRM also proposed to require
reporting and returning of affected parts to the manufacturer. The FAA
is issuing this AD to address oxygen leakage from the cylinder, which
could result in decreased or insufficient oxygen supply during a
depressurization event; and heating or flow friction, which could cause
an ignition event in the valve assembly.
Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive
Comments
The FAA received comments from one commenter, Air Line Pilots
Association, International (ALPA), who supported the NPRM without
change.
The FAA received additional comments from five commenters,
including American Airlines (AAL), Delta Air Lines (DAL), FedEx Express
(FedEx), United Airlines (UAL), and an individual. The following
presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to
each comment.
Request To Revise Applicability
AAL and UAL suggested revising the applicability statement to
include more aircraft manufacturers and models. AAL suggested adding
all airplane models that affected assemblies could be installed on, in
particular, Boeing Model 737-NG (Next Generation models are 737-600, -
700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series), 737-MAX, 777-200, and 777-
300 series airplanes. UAL also suggested adding Model 737-NG airplanes.
AAL stated that the applicability statement as proposed in the NPRM
could mislead operators into believing that the AD would apply only to
the airplanes identified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (12) of the AD.
UAL believed the suggested change will be beneficial and assist
operators in determining if their fleets are affected.
The FAA disagrees with the commenters' request. The FAA does not
have a comprehensive list of all possible affected aircraft. To address
the incomplete list, paragraph (c) of this AD identifies specific
airplane models in paragraph (c) of this AD, but also notes that the
assemblies are ``not limited to.'' The FAA has not changed the AD in
this regard.
Request To Revise Compliance Time for Parts
AAL stated that the 60-day compliance time should apply only to
valve assemblies that are installed on the aircraft and not ones in
stock. AAL believes the unsafe condition only exists when an assembly
is installed on an airplane, and for those assemblies that are not
installed on an airplane, the proposed requirements in paragraph (k) of
the proposed AD would ensure that the unsafe condition is addressed
before that assembly is installed on an aircraft.
The FAA disagrees with the request to revise the compliance time.
The FAA agrees that an affected spare part that is uninstalled and
stored off an aircraft would not cause an unsafe condition on an
aircraft. The 60-day compliance time applies to parts already installed
on an aircraft, and paragraph (k) requires that action to be done on
affected spare parts before installation, which could result in a spare
part being inspected before the 60-day compliance time. In developing
the compliance time for this AD, the FAA considered the urgency
associated with the subject unsafe condition and the availability of
required parts. The FAA determined that the 60-day compliance time for
parts already installed on an aircraft is appropriate for accomplishing
the actions required by this AD while maintaining an adequate level of
safety. The FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Remove Inspection for Serial Numbers or Include Only Valve
P/Ns
AAL requested that the inspection to verify the serial number of
the oxygen cylinder and entire assembly not be required. DAL requested
that paragraphs (c), (h), (i), and (k) of the proposed AD be revised to
remove reference to cylinder part numbers (P/Ns) and apply only to
valve assembly P/Ns. AAL stated that it reviewed the service
information and it seems that the defective part is only the valve
assembly or ``hand valve.'' DAL also reasoned that the unsafe condition
applies only to the valve assembly and not the cylinder. AAL then
reasoned that the inspection to verify the serial number should apply
only to the valve assembly or ``hand valve.'' AAL also stated that
paragraph (i) of the proposed AD also seems to require the actions of
paragraph (h)(1) through (3) of the proposed AD if a serial number of
a
cylinder was affected and a valve assembly not affected, even though it
seems that it should not require those actions.
The FAA disagrees with the request. The parts of the oxygen
cylinder and valve assemblies are interrelated, and valves from matched
sets could have fit-up issues between parts or be mixed up or swapped
during maintenance operations. The serial number inspection as proposed
would address this interchangeability. The valve and cylinder that are
part of those assemblies must also be inspected to address the unsafe
condition, not just the assemblies themselves. Therefore, the FAA
specifies to inspect the oxygen valve assemblies, and oxygen cylinder
and valve assemblies, to determine the serial number of the valve,
cylinder, and entire assembly. The FAA has not changed this AD in this
regard.
Request To Clarify Which Components Need To Be Identified
UAL requested a change to the wording of which components need the
serial number inspection. UAL stated that the statement in paragraph
(h) of the proposed AD can be misconstrued as requiring that each of
the three components (valve, cylinder, and entire assembly) be
inspected individually for suspect serial numbers. UAL inferred that
the intention is to inspect for the serial number of the entire
cylinder and valve assembly, and not the individual components. UAL
also stated that, for new oxygen cylinder assemblies from AVOX, there
are individual placards that itemize the P/N and serial number for each
component, and that for some cylinder assemblies, the serialization of
the entire cylinder and valve assembly is nearly identical in format to
the serialization of sub-component valve assemblies, which could lead
to inaccurate reporting of results. The FAA infers that UAL suggested
that the relevant numbers on the placards could be confused with other
numbers.
The FAA disagrees. Each part and assembly stated in paragraph (h)
of this AD are interrelated and must be inspected. The valve and
cylinder components that are part of those assemblies must also be
inspected for serial numbers, not just the assemblies themselves. If
the serial number markings are unclear or missing, the service
information contains information on identifying the parts and part
assemblies. The FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise Conditions for Gap Inspection and Related Actions
AAL and DAL requested changes to address concerns about what
actions are required if a part is missing a blue dot. DAL stated that
it seems best to prohibit all affected serial numbers to avoid a case
where an inspected and marked part is installed, but the blue dot
fades. AAL pointed to paragraph (i) of the proposed AD that would
clarify that only the affected serial numbers of the valve assembly
would need additional work, and, for valve assemblies marked with a
blue dot, a detailed inspection for correct spacing of the gap between
the bottom of the packing retainer and top of the valve body would not
be required. AAL stated that, as written, the proposed AD seems to
suggest that an inspection of the gap would be required regardless of
the presence of a blue dot.
The FAA disagrees with the request. The service information
specifies that if there is a doubt on the condition of a part, such as
missing serial numbers or a blue dot not definitively identified, then
the follow-on inspections are required to ensure that no discrepant or
affected part is missed. Paragraph (k) of this AD prohibits
installation of assemblies with affected serial numbers unless the
actions of paragraph (i) of this AD are accomplished. The FAA has not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Remove Inspection Report Requirement
DAL requested that the compliance times for the inspection report
be removed from paragraph (j)(1) of the proposed NPRM, and if not, the
inspection report itself be removed. AAL requested removing the
proposed requirement to submit an inspection report after accomplishing
the requirements (i.e., gap inspection) of paragraph (i) of the
proposed AD. FedEx stated reporting should not be required for units
that pass the inspection, and that sending units that failed the
inspection to the vendor should be sufficient for reporting those
failures. FedEx noted that any reporting requirements should consider
the difficulties in reporting findings in a short period of time and
noted that the inspector might not have access to the internet, email,
and a device capable of printing and scanning. FedEx opined that its
proposal would maintain accurate reporting and accommodate the
realities of a global workplace. AAL and DAL stated that the reporting
seems unnecessary and does not contribute to any additional level of
safety. AAL added that the NPRM would give operators the responsibility
of ensuring
that any affected part is returned to the manufacturer, and asserted
that an equivalent level of safety would be maintained even if the
reporting is not accomplished. DAL reasoned that if a cylinder valve
assembly is unacceptable, it would be in the operator's best interest
to report that finding to AVOX anyways so that it can receive a
replacement assembly.
The FAA disagrees. In this case, the inspection results need to be
reported to assist in tracking affected parts that are in circulation.
In addition, reporting all findings gives assurance that an inspection
was performed on an assembly with a given serial number. The FAA has
not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Remove Compliance Time for Returning Parts
AAL, DAL, and UAL requested revising paragraph (j)(2) of the
proposed AD to remove a compliance time for returning discrepant parts
to the manufacturer. AAL stated that a compliance time would not
contribute to the level of safety. AAL also stated that all discrepant
assemblies would be returned in a timely manner that is sufficient to
the operator. DAL stated that it would be an unnecessary burden on
operators to wait for AVOX's response before sending an unacceptable or
discrepant part back within the compliance time in exchange for a free-
of-charge replacement. DAL also stated that it would also be in the
operator's best interest to send in the assembly so that it can qualify
for a free-of-charge replacement if AVOX determines the part is
unacceptable or discrepant. UAL stated it also believes the instruction
to contact AVOX for shipping instructions could impede compliance with
the 30-day limit to ship discrepant parts back to AVOX. UAL also stated
that it wants to know how, for accurate AD-compliance reporting, it
would be determined that a part is being shipped back as a result of
this finding from AD-required inspections, or as a result of other,
normal repair order processes.
The FAA agrees to clarify. Paragraph (j)(2) of this AD requires
returning the assembly to the manufacturer in accordance with paragraph
3.D.(2) or 3.D.(3), as applicable, of the applicable service
information. However, the service information does not include
instructions to wait for a response from AVOX before returning the
part. In addition, the FAA has revised paragraph (j)(2) of this AD to
clarify that contacting AVOX for shipping instructions in not required.
AVOX is tracking parts that are returned to it during accomplishment of
the AD for data collection or analysis of manufacturing issues, and
AVOX is also re-conditioning parts where possible. The FAA determined
that having a 30-day compliance time for returning the part after an
inspection finding is appropriate for this AD. However, under the
provisions of paragraph (m) of this AD, an operator may request an
approval of an alternative method of compliance (AMOC). The FAA has not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Allow Later Revisions of Service Information
AAL requested that all the references to the AVOX service
information be revised to allow use of subsequent revisions. AAL
reasoned that this revision would reduce the number of AMOC requests
each time a referenced service bulletin is revised.
The FAA disagrees. In an AD, the FAA may not refer to any document
that does not yet exist. In general terms, the FAA is required by the
Office of the Federal Register (OFR) regulations for approval of
materials incorporated by reference, as specified in 1 CFR 51.1(f), to
either publish the service document contents as part of the actual AD
language; or submit the service document to the OFR for approval as
referenced material, in which case the FAA may only refer to such
material in the text of an AD. The AD may refer to the service document
only if the OFR approved it for incorporation by reference. See 1 CFR
part 51. The FAA disagrees with revising the AD to include specific
airplane models based on the corresponding service information because
the agency does not have a comprehensive list of the applicable
aircraft to which specific AVOX service information could apply. The
FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify AD Applicability With Reference to Service
Information
A commenter requested clarifying paragraph (c) of the proposed AD
by including reference to the service information that was identified
in paragraph (h) of the proposed AD. The commenter suggested revising
the paragraph so that the applicability would include information on
the service information definition of the affected units. AAL also
requested adding the airplane configuration information in the text of
the AD to add further clarification to operators and release the
technical data in a more organized fashion.
The FAA disagrees. The definition of the affected units does not
need to be moved to paragraph (c) of the AD. The effectivity of the
service information is limited to specific airplane models, but the
applicability of this AD applies to all aircraft. Because the affected
parts could be installed on additional aircraft models, the FAA has
determined that the affected parts could later be installed on aircraft
that were initially delivered with acceptable parts, thereby subjecting
those aircraft to the unsafe condition. The FAA has not changed this AD
in this regard.
Request To Revise Compliance Time for Parts Identification
DAL and UAL requested revising the compliance time proposed in
paragraph (h) of the proposed NPRM. DAL and UAL stated that since many
operators have parked their aircraft or severely reduced usage of
aircraft, an extension of the compliance time (either with additional
calendar days or adding an option for flight hours and flight cycles),
would allow operators additional time for compliance. UAL also stated
that the supply chain could be affected due to potential increased
shipping time and workforce reductions.
The FAA disagrees with the request to extend the compliance time.
The FAA acknowledges the effects that the pandemic response might have
on operators' fleet use, supply chain, and maintenance personnel. In
developing an appropriate compliance time for this action, the FAA
considered the degree of urgency associated with addressing the subject
unsafe condition, the manufacturer's recommendation for an appropriate
compliance time, and the practical aspect of accomplishing the required
inspection within a period of time that corresponds to the normal
scheduled maintenance for most affected operators. In addition, the FAA
notes that some aircraft may have been in service during the pandemic
and must comply within the required compliance time. Operators do have
the option to inspect the airplane before the first flight following
storage if the airplane is in storage for more than 27 months. However,
under the provisions of paragraph (m) of this AD, the FAA will consider
requests for an extension of the compliance time if sufficient data are
submitted to substantiate that the new compliance time would provide an
acceptable level of safety. The FAA has not changed this AD in this
regard.
Request To Allow Use of Alternatives for Parts Marking
FedEx requested that the specification to use oil-based blue ink
markers be modified to allow alternative methods and colors such as black
indelible ink. FedEx stated that oil-based blue paint markers are not
readily available or kept in stock regularly. FedEx suggested that a
list of part numbers for approved, aircraft grade, oil-based paint be
provided.
The FAA disagrees. While the FAA realizes this is a limitation,
there must be one standard to help avoid confusion. The procedures
required by this AD specify actions based on the presence or absence of
a blue dot in a specific location. The FAA has not seen any
difficulties in obtaining the paint markers. However, under the
provisions of paragraph (m) of this AD, any person may request an
approval of an AMOC. The FAA has not revised this AD in this regard.
Request To Allow Alternative Means of Measuring Gaps
FedEx requested that the proposed AD be revised to allow use of
feeler gauges, calipers, and other means of measuring the gap in
imperial units of measure. FedEx stated that the service information
specifies use of pin gauges that are made for metric units of measure,
and that acquiring those metric pin gauges is an extra expense and
logistical complication. FedEx recommended adding a tolerance to the
gap measurement and specifying a fractional imperial measure (\3/32\-
inch) that is close to the metric unit specified. FedEx suggested that
if a tolerance or other measurement is not added, then a manufacturer
part number (MPN) for a specific tool or supplier should be provided.
The FAA disagrees. Using other means of measuring could introduce
or increase variables that could affect the accuracy of the
measurement. The FAA understands that not everyone has the same
resources, tools, or supplies; however, the FAA also understands that
this means of measurement is easily accessible. Under the provisions of
paragraph (m) of this AD, operators may request approval of an AMOC if
sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the tolerance would
provide an acceptable level of safety. The FAA has not changed this AD
in this regard.
Request To Revise Procedure for Shipping an Assembly
FedEx requested that the proposed AD be revised to allow operators
to use their own procedures for shipping dangerous goods such as
unopened cylinder valve assemblies (CVAs) instead of the procedure
specified in the service information. FedEx explained that it has
established and accepted procedures for shipping dangerous goods, and
that the disposition of an unopened CVA would be done by a department
separate from the one doing the inspection. FedEx stated that following
the procedures in the service information would require additional
coordination time, and that the wording of the procedures would not
function properly with its AD compliance mechanisms.
The FAA agrees to clarify. The design approval holder (DAH) of the
affected valve assemblies has specified a method for shipping, or
returning, an unopened CVA that has been found to be unacceptable or
discrepant, specifically a shipping method that is compliant with DOT
standard HM-224B. If FedEx has procedures that are compliant with DOT
standard HM-224B, then those procedures are acceptable for compliance
with this AD. For procedures that are not compliant with DOT standard
HM-224B, under the provisions of paragraph (m) of this AD, the FAA will
consider requests for an AMOC. The FAA has not changed this AD in this
regard.
Request for Clarification on Applicability of AD
FedEx requested clarification on whether the proposed AD is written
``against'' the MPN or the serial numbers within that MPN. FedEx
explained the effects on the operator's workload and also on the
operational impact of a unit's overhaul cycle in conjunction with a 60-
day compliance time and the scope of the applicability. FedEx added
that a 180-day compliance time would be more reasonable.
The FAA agrees to clarify. The applicability of this AD is written
against the MPN and specific serial numbers, in addition to manufacture
dates of the assemblies. The FAA disagrees to revise the compliance
time because the FAA has determined that requirement based on a risk
calculation. The FAA has not changed this AD in that regard.
Request To Clarify Requirement if Component Number(s) Cannot Be
Determined
UAL requested clarification on what actions are required in the
event the P/N or serial number information cannot be determined. UAL
stated that as a result of in-service activity, that information might
be illegible, unintentionally obliterated, or missing from the placard.
UAL added that under its normal practices, whenever a part or serial
number cannot be determined, the part is considered suspect, made
unserviceable, and removed from service. UAL stated that, when the P/N
of the entire cylinder and valve assembly can be determined but not the
serial number, and the date of manufacture is between January and
November 2018, it wants to still be able to establish conformity by
inspecting for the presence of the blue dot and accomplish the
applicable service information instruction if the blue dot is missing.
UAL also stated that depending on the FAA's response to this request,
it may apply for an AMOC.
The FAA agrees to clarify. The service information states to
inspect for the manufacturing date, serial number, and the presence of
a blue dot. The service information then states that if there is doubt
or a determination cannot be made (such as the numbers or dot is not
clearly identified), to proceed with the follow-on inspection for
proper gap spacing (this follow-on inspection is required by paragraph
(i) of this AD). The FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.
Request for Clarification on Compliance Time and Method for Inspection
Report
UAL requested clarification on how a 30-day requirement for the
inspection report was determined, and if a ``comprehensive'' report is
acceptable. UAL stated that it understands the need for the information
gathered from the reports; however, it does not understand why or how
a
30-day compliance time was established. UAL also stated that it assumed
that reporting of the results should be done as a single, comprehensive
report and not piece-wise (individually for each assembly or aircraft),
and that the report does not need to be an exact copy of the report
form in the service information.
The FAA agrees to clarify. The FAA determined that the 30-day
compliance time is appropriate for this AD. Also, the manufacturer is
collecting information for analysis of manufacturing issues. The format
of the report may be done as UAL assumed, as long as all documents are
labeled correctly. However, under the provisions of paragraph (m) of
this AD, an operator may request an approval of an AMOC. The FAA has
not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Provide Clarification on Reporting Form
UAL requested clarification on the definition of ``manufacture
date'' in a recording column of a report form in the service
information. UAL stated that it is implied that ``manufacture date'' in
that column is the manufacture date of
the entire cylinder and valve assembly and not of the valve assembly.
The FAA agrees to clarify. The ``manufacturer date'' is not limited
to the date of the entire cylinder and valve assembly, but is the
manufacture date of each part or assembly that might be recorded in the
inspection report, such as the assemblies listed in Appendix 1 of the
service information. The FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.
Conclusion
The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments
received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as
proposed. Except for minor editorial changes, this AD is adopted as
proposed in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic
burden on any operator.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
The FAA reviewed AVOX Systems Inc. Alert Service Bulletins
10015804-35-01, Revision 02, dated October 16, 2019; 10015804-35-02,
Revision 2, dated October 31, 2019; and 10015804-35-03, Revision 02,
dated October 15, 2019. This service information describes procedures
for an inspection to determine the serial numbers of the oxygen
cylinder and valve assemblies, and the oxygen valve assemblies, a
detailed inspection for correct spacing of the gap between the bottom
of the packing retainer and top of the valve body on the assemblies,
parts marking, inspection report, and return of parts to the
manufacturer. These documents are distinct since they apply to
different assembly part numbers. This service information is reasonably
available because the interested parties have access to it through
their normal course of business or by the means identified in
ADDRESSES.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD affects up to 3,034 oxygen cylinder
and valve assemblies, and oxygen valve assemblies, installed on various
transport category airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the
following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
Action
|
Labor cost
|
Parts cost
|
Cost per
product
|
Cost on
U.S. operators
|
Serial number inspection |
1 work-hour x $85 per hour =
$85 |
None
|
$85
|
$257,890
|
Reporting |
1 work-hour x $85 per hour =
$85 |
0
|
85
|
257,890
|
The FAA estimates the following costs
to do any necessary follow-on
actions that would be required based on the results of the inspection.
The FAA has no way of determining the number of aircraft that might
need these actions:
On-Condition Costs *
Action
|
Labor cost
|
Parts cost
|
Cost per
product
|
Detailed inspection |
1 work-hour x $85 per hour =
$85 |
None
|
$85
|
* The FAA has received no definitive
data on the cost of on-condition
replacements.
According to the manufacturer, some or all of the costs of this AD
may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on
affected operators. The FAA does not control warranty coverage for
affected operators. As a result, the FAA has included all known costs
in the cost estimate.
Paperwork Reduction Act
A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not
required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for
failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of
information displays a currently valid OMB Control Number. The OMB
Control Number for this information collection is 2120-0056. Public
reporting for this collection of information is estimated to take
approximately 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing
instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the
collection of information. All responses to this collection of
information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate
or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection
Clearance Officer, Federal Aviation Administration, 10101 Hillwood
Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177-1524.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:
|