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ADs updated daily at www.Tdata.com
PROPOSED AD AIRBUS HELICOPTERS: Docket No. FAA-2022-0295; Project Identifier MCAI-2021-00840-R.
(a) COMMENTS DUE DATE

    The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive (AD)  by
    May 26, 2022.

(b) AFFECTED ADS

    None.

(c) APPLICABILITY

    This AD applies to all  Airbus Helicopters Model AS-365N2,  AS 365 N3,
    EC  155B,  EC155B1,  and  SA-365N1  helicopters,  certificated  in any
    category.

(d) SUBJECT

    Joint Aircraft Service  Component (JASC) Code  6500, Tail Rotor  Drive
    System.

(e) UNSAFE CONDITION

    This AD  was prompted  by a  large amount  of critical scale particles
    found on  the tail  rotor gearbox  (TGB) chip  detector magnetic  plug
    during an unscheduled check of the TGB. The particles belonged to  the
    double bearing (pitch control  rod bearing) installed inside  the TGB.
    The  FAA  is  issuing  this  AD  to  prevent  bearing  degradation and
    subsequent  failure. The  unsafe condition,  if  not  addressed, could
    result in loss of yaw control of the helicopter.

(f) COMPLIANCE

    Comply  with this  AD within  the compliance  times specified,  unless
    already done.

(g) REQUIREMENTS

    Except as specified in paragraph (h)  of this AD:  Comply with all re-
    quired actions and compliance times specified in,  and  in  accordance
    with, European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2021-0170, dated
    July 19, 2021 (EASA AD 2021-0170).

(h) EXCEPTIONS TO EASA AD 2021-0170

(1) Where EASA AD 2021-0170  requires compliance in terms  of flight hours
    (FH), this AD requires using hours time-in-service (TIS).

(2) Where EASA AD 2021-0170  refers  to  the  effective dates specified in
    paragraphs (h)(2)(i) through (iii) of this AD,  this AD requires using
    the effective date of this AD.

(i) October 28, 2019  (the  effective  date of EASA AD 2019-0267-E,  dated
    October 25, 2019).

(ii) November 19, 2019  (the effective date of EASA AD 2019-0267R1,  dated
     November 12, 2019 and corrected November 13, 2019).

(iii) The effective date of EASA AD 2021-0170.

(3) Where EASA AD 2021-0170  requires  actions  during  each  "after  last
    flight (ALF) of the day inspection"  or "ALF,"  this AD requires those
    actions before the first flight of each day.

(4) Where paragraph (7) of EASA AD 2021-0170  specifies "any discrepancy,"
    for this AD discrepancies include the presence of particles and  other
    conditions such  as abrasions,  particles that  consist of  any scale,
    chip, flake, splinter, M50 particles, magnetic abrasion dust, or other
    particles other than cotter pin fragments, pieces of lock wire, swarf,
    or miscellaneous non-metallic waste.

(5) Where paragraph (8)  of EASA AD 2021-0170  specifies for Group 2 heli-
    copters,  the  first  replacement   of  the  affected  part   must  be
    accomplished not later than December  31, 2021, this AD requires,  for
    Group 2  helicopters, the  first replacement  of the  affected part as
    defined in  EASA AD  2021-0170 must  be accomplished  within 5  months
    after the effective date of this AD.

(6) Where any work card  referenced in the service information  referenced
    in EASA AD  2021-0170 specifies "if  there is an  anomaly, replace the
    chip detector," or "if there is an anomaly, replace the TGB electrical
    magnetic  plug,"  for this  AD  an anomaly  may  be indicated  by  the
    magnetic component  of the  TGB chip  detector or  the TGB  electrical
    magnetic plug not  being magnetized. If  there is an  anomaly, this AD
    requires before  further flight,  removing from  service the  TGB chip
    detector or  the TGB  electrical magnetic  plug as  applicable to your
    model helicopter.

(7) Where any work card  referenced in the service information  referenced
    in EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies "make sure that the chip detector is in
    good condition," or "make sure  that the TGB electrical magnetic  plug
    is in  good condition,"  as applicable  to your  model helicopter, for
    this AD "good condition" is indicated when there are no signs of  wear
    on the locking  systems (including wear  on the bayonets,  and slotted
    tubes). If there are any signs of wear on the locking systems, this AD
    requires before  further flight,  removing from  service the  TGB chip
    detector or the TGB magnetic electrical magnetic plug as applicable to
    your model helicopter.

(8) Where any work card  referenced in the service information  referenced
    in EASA AD  2021-0170 specifies "if  necessary, replace the  O-rings,"
    this AD requires before  further flight, removing any  affected O-ring
    from service.

(9) Where the service information  referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170  speci-
    fies  to  return  certain parts  to  the  manufacturer, including  for
    repair, this AD does not require returning parts to the  manufacturer,
    however, this AD  does require before  further flight, repair  done in
    accordance with a method approved by the Manager, General Aviation and
    Rotorcraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA; or EASA;  or
    Airbus  Helicopters'  EASA  Design  Organization  Approval  (DOA).  If
    approved  by the  DOA, the  approval must  include the  DOA-authorized
    signature.

(10) Where the service information  referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 speci-
     fies to remove the TGB as per technical documentation, or remove  the
     concerned module(s), this AD requires before further flight, removing
     the TGB and replacing it with an airworthy part, or repairing the TGB
     in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, General Aviation
     & Rotorcraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA; or  EASA;
     or Airbus Helicopters' EASA DOA. If approved by the DOA, the approval
     must include the DOA-authorized signature.

(11) Where the service information  referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 speci-
     fies if the collected particles cannot be clearly defined, perform  a
     metallurgical  analysis  and   contact  Airbus  Helicopters,   before
     continuing  flights,  this  AD does  require  before  further flight,
     characterization  of  the  particles  collected,  and  performing   a
     metallurgical analysis for any particles collected using a method  in
     accordance with  FAA-approved procedures.  However, this  AD does not
     require contacting the manufacturer to determine the characterization
     of the particles collected.

(12) Where the service information or any work card  referenced in EASA AD
     2021-0170 specifies to do the actions  identified  in  paragraphs (h)
     (12)(i) through (v) of this AD,  this  AD  does not include those re-
     quirements.

(i) Complete Appendix 4.A and 4.B.

(ii) Comply with paragraph 2.D.

(iii) Send all  collected particles  and  metallurgical analysis report to
      depot level maintenance facility with the concerned module.

(iv) Inform EST using chip detection tracking sheet.

(v) Complete the "Particle Detection" follow up sheet.

(13) Where a work card referenced in the service information referenced in
     EASA  AD  2021-0170  specifies  "send  all  oversized  particles  for
     analysis and wait for results before continuing flight," this AD does
     not  require sending  particles for  analysis, however  this AD  does
     require before further flight, analyzing the particles using a method
     in accordance with FAA-approved procedures.

(14) This AD does not mandate  compliance  with  the  "Remarks" section of
     EASA AD 2021-0170.

(15) Where paragraph (7) of EASA AD 2021-0170  specifies to accomplish the
     applicable corrective actions  "within the compliance time as identi-
     fied in the applicable ASB,"  this AD requires  accomplishing correc-
     tive actions before further flight.

(16) Where paragraph (1) of EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies "within the appli-
     cable compliance time as identified in the close monitoring and until
     completion of the close monitoring,"  this AD requires  a close moni-
     toring compliance time of a total of 25 hours TIS.

(i) NO REPORTING REQUIREMENT

    Although the service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 spec-
    ifies to submit certain information to the manufacturer,  this AD does
    not include that requirement.

(j) SPECIAL FLIGHT PERMIT

    Special flight permits may be issued  in accordance with 14 CFR 21.197
    and 21.199, provided no passengers are onboard.

(k) ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF COMPLIANCE (AMOCS)

(1) The Manager, International Validation Branch,  FAA,  has the authority
    to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures  found
    in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to
    your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as
    appropriate. If  sending information  directly to  the manager  of the
    International  Validation  Branch, send  it  to the  attention  of the
    person identified in paragraph (l)(2)  of this AD. Information may  be
    emailed to: 9-AVS-AIR-730-AMOC@faa.gov.

(2) Before using any approved AMOC,  notify your appropriate principal in-
    spector, or lacking  a principal inspector,  the manager of  the local
    flight standards district office/certificate holding district office.

(l) RELATED INFORMATION

(1) For EASA AD 2021-0170,  contact  EASA,  Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3,  50668
    Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email ADs@easa.europa.eu
    internet www.easa.europa.eu.  You may view  this material  at the FAA,
    Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy,
    Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability
    of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110. This material may be
    found in the AD docket at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for
    and locating Docket No. FAA-2022-0295.

(2) For more information about this AD,  contact Andrea Jimenez, Aerospace
    Engineer,  COS Program Management Section,  Operational Safety Branch,
    Compliance & Airworthiness Division, FAA, 1600 Stewart Ave, Suite 410,
    Westbury, NY 11590; telephone (516) 228-7330; email andrea.jimenez@faa
    .gov.

Issued on March 22, 2022. Lance T. Gant, Director, Compliance & Airworthi-
ness Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by May 26, 2022.
PREAMBLE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2022-0295; Project Identifier MCAI-2021-00840-R]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD)
for all Airbus Helicopters Model AS-365N2, AS 365 N3, EC 155B, EC155B1,
and SA-365N1 helicopters. This proposed AD was prompted by a large
amount of critical scale particles found on the tail rotor gearbox
(TGB) chip detector magnetic plug during an unscheduled check of the
TGB. The particles belonged to the double bearing (pitch control rod
bearing) installed inside the TGB. This proposed AD would require
repetitive inspections of the TGB chip detector for particles,
analyzing any particles collected, performing a double bearing washing,
repetitive replacements of certain part-numbered
double bearings, and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is proposed for
incorporation by reference (IBR). The FAA is proposing this AD to
address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by May 26,
2022.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions
for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For EASA material that is proposed for IBR in this AD, contact
EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221
8999 000; email ADs@easa.europa.eu; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You
may find the EASA material on the EASA website at https://ad.easa.europa.eu.
You may view this material at the FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-321,
Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110. The EASA material is also
available at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating
Docket No. FAA-2022-0295.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2022-0295; or in person at
Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this NPRM, the EASA AD,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
Docket Operations is listed above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Andrea Jimenez, Aerospace Engineer,
COS Program Management Section, Operational Safety Branch, Compliance &
Airworthiness Division, FAA, 1600 Stewart Ave., Suite 410, Westbury, NY
11590; telephone (516) 228-7330; email andrea.jimenez@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed
under ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2022-0295; Project Identifier
MCAI-2021-00840-R'' at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful
comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposal because of those comments.
Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to
https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you
provide. The agency will also post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact received about this NPRM.

Confidential Business Information

CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain commercial
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to
this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public
docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to
Andrea Jimenez, Aerospace Engineer, COS Program Management Section,
Operational Safety Branch, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, FAA,
1600 Stewart Ave., Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone (516) 228-
7330; email andrea.jimenez@faa.gov. Any commentary that the FAA
receives that is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in
the public docket for this rulemaking.

Background

EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the
European Union, has issued EASA AD 2021-0170, dated July 19, 2021 (EASA
AD 2021-0170), to correct an unsafe condition for all Airbus
Helicopters (AH), formerly Eurocopter, Eurocopter France, Aerospatiale,
Sud Aviation, Model AS 365 N2, AS 365 N3, EC 155 B, EC 155 B1 and SA
365 N1 helicopters.
This proposed AD was prompted by a large amount of critical scale
particles found on the TGB chip detector magnetic plug during an
unscheduled check of a Model AS 365 N2 helicopter. EASA advises the
particles belonged to the double bearing (pitch control rod bearing)
installed inside the TGB and further advises the reported event showed
a speed of degradation faster than expected. The FAA is proposing this
AD to prevent bearing degradation and subsequent failure, which could
result in loss of yaw control. See EASA AD 2021-0170 for additional
background information.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

EASA AD 2021-0170 requires analyzing any particles collected during
close monitoring or during any required inspections, repetitive
inspections of the TGB chip detector for particles, performing a double
bearing washing, and corrective actions. Corrective actions include
removing an affected TGB and repairing or replacing that TGB, sending
affected parts and certain information to the manufacturer, replacing a
TGB chip detector or TGB electrical magnetic plug, and replacing an
affected O-ring and double bearing. EASA AD 2021-0170 also requires
performing a double bearing washing or performing a metallurgical
analysis based on inspection results.
EASA AD 2021-0170 also requires for any double bearing part number
(P/N) 704A33-651-245 or 704A33-651-246, installed on any TGB P/N
365A33-6005-09, before exceeding 610 flight hours (FH) since first
installation, or within 110 FH after October 28, 2019 (the effective
date of EASA AD 2019-0267-E, dated October 25, 2019), whichever occurs
later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 FH, replacing the
affected double bearing with a serviceable one. EASA AD 2021-0170
allows double bearing part number P/N 704A33-651-245 or 704A33-651-246
to be installed, provided it has never been installed on a helicopter
and it is inspected as required by EASA AD 2021-0170. Finally, EASA AD
2021-0170 allows TGB P/N 365A33-6005-09 to be installed, provided it
has a serviceable double bearing installed that is inspected as
required by the EASA AD.
This material is reasonably available because the interested
parties have access to it through their normal course
of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Other Related Service Information

The FAA reviewed Airbus Helicopters Emergency Alert Service
Bulletin (EASB) No. 01.00.24 for non FAA-type certificated military
Model AS565MA, MB, MBe, SA, SB, and UB helicopters; EASB No. 01.00.71
for Model AS365N1, N2, and N3 helicopters, and non FAA-type
certificated military Model AS365F, Fi, K, and K2 helicopters; EASB No.
01.31 for non FAA-type certificated military Model SA366GA helicopters;
and EASB No. 04A016 for Model EC155B and B1 helicopters, each Revision
3 and dated June 14, 2021 (co-published as one document).
This service information specifies procedures to inspect the TGB
chip detector for particles, analyze and define the particles by
performing a metallurgical analysis, perform a washing of the double
bearing, replace the double bearing, and send certain information and
affected parts to the manufacturer.

FAA's Determination

These helicopters have been approved by EASA and are approved for
operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA's bilateral
agreement with the European Union, EASA has notified the FAA about the
unsafe condition described in its AD. The FAA is proposing this AD
after evaluating all known relevant information and determining that
the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop
on other helicopters of the same type design.

Proposed AD Requirements in This NPRM

This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified
in EASA AD 2021-0170, described previously, as incorporated by
reference, except for any differences identified as exceptions in the
regulatory text of this proposed AD and except as discussed under
``Differences Between this Proposed AD and EASA AD 2021-0170.''

Explanation of Required Compliance Information

In the FAA's ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency of the AD
process, the FAA developed a process to use some civil aviation
authority (CAA) ADs as the primary source of information for compliance
with requirements for corresponding FAA ADs. The FAA has been
coordinating this process with manufacturers and CAAs. As a result, the
FAA proposes to incorporate EASA AD 2021-0170 by reference in the FAA
final rule. This proposed AD would, therefore, require compliance with
EASA AD 2021-0170 in its entirety through that incorporation, except
for any differences identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of
this proposed AD. Using common terms that are the same as the heading
of a particular section in EASA AD 2021-0170 does not mean that
operators need comply only with that section. For example, where the AD
requirement refers to ``all required actions and compliance times,''
compliance with this AD requirement is not limited to the section
titled ``Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s)'' in EASA AD 2021-
0170. Service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 for
compliance will be available at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2022-0295 after the FAA final
rule is published.

Differences Between This Proposed AD and EASA AD 2021-0170

Service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-0170 specifies
sending compliance forms, and certain parts to the manufacturer; this
proposed AD would not. Service information referenced in EASA AD 2021-
0170 specifies contacting Airbus Helicopters for approved repairs or
corrective actions if certain discrepancies are found, whereas this
proposed AD would require accomplishing repairs or corrective actions
using a method approved by the Manager, General Aviation and Rotorcraft
Section, International Validation Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus
Helicopters' EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by
the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature.

Interim Action

The FAA considers this proposed AD would be an interim action. If
final action is later identified, the FAA might consider further
rulemaking.

Costs of Compliance

The FAA estimates that this AD, if adopted as proposed, would
affect 53 helicopters of U.S. Registry. Labor rates are estimated at
$85 per work-hour. Based on these numbers, the FAA estimates the
following costs to comply with this proposed AD.
Analyzing any particles collected during close monitoring would
take about 1 work-hour for an estimated cost of $85 per inspection and
up to $4,505 for the U.S. fleet.
Replacing a double bearing would take about 16 work-hours and parts
cost about $1,620 for an estimated cost of 2,980 per replacement and
$157,940 for the U.S. fleet.
Inspecting the TGB chip detector for particles would take about 1
work-hour for an estimated cost of $85 per inspection and $4,505 for
the U.S. fleet.
Performing a double bearing washing would take about 8 work-hours
for an estimated cost of $680 per helicopter.
The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary on-
condition replacements that would be required based on the results of
the inspection. The agency has no way of determining the number of
aircraft that might need these on-condition replacements:
Analyzing collected particles would take about 1 work-hour for an
estimated cost of $85 per helicopter.
Replacing a double bearing would take about 16 work-hours and parts
would cost about $1,620 for an estimated cost of $2,980 per bearing.
Replacing a TGB chip detector or TGB electrical magnetic plug would
take about 1 work-hour and parts would cost about $900 for an estimated
cost of $985 per part replacement.
Replacing an O-ring would take about 1 work-hour and parts would
cost about $100 for an estimated cost of $185 per O-ring.
Replacing a TGB would take about 8 work-hours and parts would cost
about $155,302 for an estimated cost of $155,982 per replacement.
The FAA has received no definitive data for the repair cost of a
TGB.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Would not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES


1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive: