DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2016-6616; Product Identifier 2016-CE-004-AD; Amendment
39-19177; AD 2018-03-04]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Rosemount Aerospace, Inc. Pitot Probes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
Rosemount Aerospace Model 851AK pitot probes that were repaired by CSI
Aerospace, Inc. between January 2013 and July 2014 that are installed
on airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that certain pitot
probes are indicating the wrong airspeed during flight. This AD
requires inspecting the airplane to determine the number of affected
pitot probes installed and replacing the affected pitot probes. We are
issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective March 16, 2018.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.
gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-
6616; or in person at the Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
The AD docket contains this final rule, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The street address for
Docket Operations (phone: 800-647-5527) is U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jonathan Kim, Aerospace Engineer, Fort
Worth ACO Branch, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, Texas 76177-
1524; telephone: (817) 222-5131; fax: (817) 222-5245; email:
jonathan.kim@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to Rosemount Aerospace Model
851AK pitot probes that were repaired by CSI Aerospace, Inc. between
January 2013 and July 2014 that are installed on airplanes. The NPRM
was published in the Federal Register on May 11, 2016 (81 FR 29193).
The NPRM was prompted by a report that certain pitot probes are
indicating the wrong airspeed during flight. The NPRM proposed to
require inspecting the airplane to determine the number of affected
pitot probes installed and replacing the affected pitot probes. We are
issuing this AD to prevent incorrect airspeed indications during
flight, which could lead to loss of control. Due to design redundancy,
this is only applicable if more than one deficient probe is installed.

Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and
the FAA's response to each comment.

Support for the AD

Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) supported the
proposed AD as written.
We have not changed this AD action based on this comment.

Request To Revise the Description of the Unsafe Condition

Andy Feely of CSI Aerospace, Inc. (CSI) stated that they do not
have any data which confirms that the inaccurate airspeed occurred
during flight ``in icing conditions.''
The commenter also stated that in the proposed AD, in the Summary,
Discussion, and paragraph (e) Unsafe Condition sections, several
references are made to the reported problem occurring ``in icing
conditions.'' CSI does not have any data to support this statement.
This statement is inconsistent with the field data that CSI has been
able to collect. CSI has communicated with affected operators and has
been unable to confirm experiences of inaccurate airspeed reporting
during flight ``in icing conditions.'' CSI has a service difficulty
report (SDR) where the airplane had varying airspeed indications from
the airspeed indication systems (pitot probes), however, it does not
contain a report of icing conditions.
The commenter requested removing all references to ``icing
conditions'' throughout the final rule AD action.
We partially agree with the commenter. We agree to remove the
language ``icing conditions'' from the Summary, Discussion, and
paragraph (e) of the AD because the SDR report that prompted the AD
action does not provide meteorological conditions. However, we disagree
that icing conditions do not contribute to the unsafe condition. There
is evidence that the migrated braze material may present a non-
conforming, forward facing surface inside the pitot throat on which ice
crystals may accumulate when they make contact and could lead to the
incorrect airspeed indications.
We have changed the AD as indicated above.

Request To Clarify Summary

Andy Feely of CSI stated that there is a specific time period that
the affected pitot probes were repaired by CSI.
The commenter requested that the specific time period of between
January 2013 and July 2014 be added in the Summary section of the final
rule AD action to clarify the applicability of the affected pitot
probes and to be consistent with the dates in the Discussion section of
the proposed AD.
We agree with the commenter. We have changed this AD action based
on this comment.

Request To Revise the FAA's Determination Section

Andy Feely of CSI stated that the FAA's Determination section in
the proposed AD does not accurately reflect the scope of the unsafe
condition. It implies a more widespread problem. Through CSI's
immediate actions taken, once notified of the initial report (March
2014), all suspect serial numbers of the affected pitot probes were
identified and located. All affected customers were notified and were
provided instructions to inspect, scrap, return and/or replace the
suspect probes. The commenter also stated that it is his opinion that
this condition is not ``likely to exist or develop in other products of
the same type design'' because the probes were located, contained, and
monitored.
The commenter requested a revision to this section to more
accurately indicate the scope of the unsafe condition.
We do not agree with the commenter. In 14 CFR, section 39.5, the
FAA is required to issue an AD when we find that an unsafe condition
exists in a product and the condition is likely to exist or develop in
other products of the same type design. We have determined that this AD
meets these requirements.
We have not changed this AD action based on this comment.

Request To Revise the Applicability Section

Andy Feely of CSI stated that the Applicability section should
include a statement to clarify the time period to narrow the actual
scope of the problem and to be consistent with the dates stated in the
Discussion section of the proposed AD. The commenter also stated that
pitot probes re-repaired after August 1, 2014, are no longer part of
the affected probes.
The commenter requested that paragraph (c) of the final rule AD be
revised to add the specific time period the affected probes were
repaired by CSI and to specify the serial numbers of pitot probes
repaired after August 1, 2014, which are no longer part of the affected
probes.
We partially agree with the commenter. We agree with including a
statement in the Applicability section that suspect probes that were
re-repaired by CSI Aerospace, Inc. after August 1, 2014, are not at
risk because corrective actions have been taken to address the unsafe
condition. We have changed the final rule AD action to add the serial
numbers of the re-repaired probes to the Applicability section. Because
we are relaxing the requirement to allow probes to be re-repaired after
August 2014 and CSI is confident that these probes were re-repaired
after August 2014, this does not add any additional burden to
operators.

We disagree with removing the serial numbers of re-repaired pitot
probes from the Applicability section because we do not want to omit
serial numbers from the final rule AD action based on claims that
affected parts are already in compliance with the actions of the
proposed AD. The original list of serial numbers provided in the
proposed AD did not include serial numbers of re-repaired probes, but
we have added them to the final rule AD action. Again, adding these
serial numbers does not impose a burden on the public and this AD only
documents those serial numbers that originally had the unsafe
condition. All airplanes that had probes previously repaired would not
be subject to any actions of this AD other than the requirement to
assure that no suspect probe is installed in the future.
We have not changed this AD action based on this part of the
comment.

Request To Correct Serial Number of Affect Pitot Probe

Andy Feely of CSI stated that the serial number of pitot probe
88912 in the proposed AD is incorrect.
The commenter requested the serial number be corrected to 88192 in
the final rule AD action.
We agree with the commenter and have changed this AD action based
on this comment.

Request To Allow Maintenance Records Review

Andy Feely of CSI and Ryan Hall of Delta Air Lines stated that
operators who have serial number traceability of the affected pitot
probes fully documented in their maintenance records should be
permitted to do a records review in order to determine location and
number of affected probes installed on their airplane(s).
The commenters requested that paragraph (g) of the final rule AD
action be changed to include a review of the maintenance records in
lieu of a physical inspection of the airplane if the serial number and
repair date of the pitot probe can be positively identified.
We agree with the commenter. Many operators keep thorough
maintenance records that make it possible to positively identify the
serial number of the affected probe and the repair date from a review
their maintenance records.
We have changed this AD action based on this comment.

Request To Clarify Compliance

Andy Feely of CSI stated it is not initially clear to owners/
operators who have determined, either through inspection of the
airplane, through maintenance records review, or that action was
already taken before the effective date of this AD to assure that no
more than one affected probe remains on the airplane and that two out
of the three pitot probes installed on their airplane are not affected
are in compliance with certain portions of the proposed AD.
The commenter requested an additional statement be added to
paragraph (g) of the final rule AD action to clarify that no further
action is required except for the ongoing requirement in paragraph
(h)(2) of this final rule AD action if airplane inspection or
maintenance records review reveals that no more than one affected probe
remains on the airplane.
We agree with the commenter and have changed this AD action based
on this comment.

Request To Clarify Replacement Requirement

Andy Feely of CSI stated that in the proposed AD it is unclear when
the replacement of the affected pitot probes is required.
The commenter requested to have the words ``after the effective
date of this AD'' removed from paragraph (h)(1) of the final rule AD
action.
We do not agree with the commenter. If it is determined that the
pitot probes are required to be replaced, as specified in paragraph
(h)(1) of the proposed AD, the operator will have two months after the
effective date of the final rule AD action to do so.
We have not changed this AD action based on this comment.

Request To Remove Certain Pitot Probes From the Applicability

Andy Feely of CSI stated that as a result of the aggressive
voluntary corrective action plan by CSI and the airlines, the serial
number listing of the affected pitot probes has been greatly reduced.
The commenter stated that robust traceability by serial number,
delivery date, and customer, have allowed CSI and its customers the
ability to proactively remove the affected probes for re-repair or
scrap. CSI maintains very tight coordination with the affected
customers and is aware of the status of all affected pitot probes.
The commenter has requested that many of the pitot probes listed in
the Applicability section be removed from the final rule AD action.
We do not agree with the commenter. We disagree with removing the
serial numbers of re-repaired or scrapped pitot probes from the
Applicability section of the final rule AD action because we do not
want to omit serial numbers based on claims that affected parts are
already in compliance. We acknowledge that CSI has made significant
efforts to remove all affected pitot probes from the fleet and to
communicate their efforts to the FAA; however, after their effort was
complete, approximately 100 pitot probes could not be accounted for.
We have not changed this AD action based on this comment.

Request To Extend Compliance Time for Replacement

Robert Holcomb of American Airlines stated that the final rule AD
should take into account the burden of costs associated with acquiring
additional spares to meet the two-month replacement compliance time.
The commenter stated that American Airlines owns 197 of the
affected pitot probes. Of the 197 affected pitot probes, 83 are on
active airplanes and 21 of those have been re-repaired. The commenter
also stated that American Airlines has not had any failures of the
affected pitot probes and currently has 87 active airplanes with
potential to have an affected pitot probe installed.
The commenter requested increasing the replacement compliance time
to 6 months based on lack of failures on the MD80 fleet, current spare
constraints, and turnaround time of re-repaired pitot probes.
We do not agree with the commenter. We received a report about
erroneous airspeed data being transmitted from multiple Rosemount
Aerospace Model 851AK pitot probes repaired by CSI when installed on a
Boeing Aircraft Company Model B717 airplane. Because we cannot say with
certainty when or where this unsafe condition will manifest in the
pitot probe, we are unable to increase the replacement compliance time
to six months without additional justification. If operators have
substantiating data to demonstrate that an acceptable level of safety
has been met with a change in compliance time or other changes to this
AD, we will consider an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) to the
final rule AD action on a case by case basis. We do not provide costs
beyond initial work hours and parts costs. Therefore, accounting for
costs associated with acquiring spares is beyond the scope of our
policy.
We have not changed this AD action based on this comment.

Request To Clarify Exclusion of Certain Pitot Probes From the
Applicability

Ryan Hall of Delta Air Lines stated that it is not clear in the
Applicability section of the proposed AD that pitot
probes repaired by CSI on or after August 1, 2014, are not part of the
applicability.
The commenter stated that paragraph (c) of proposed rule AD applies
to pitot probes that were repaired by CSI and have a serial number
listed in paragraph (c)(1) of this AD that are known to be installed on
aircraft. However, paragraph (h)(3) of the proposed AD contains the
phrase, `unless it has been repaired by CSI and has a date of August 1,
2014, or later.
The commenter requested that the Applicability section of the final
rule AD action be revised to include the statement excluding pitot
probes repaired by CSI Aerospace, Inc. after August 1, 2014, from the
applicability.
We agree with the commenter and have changed this AD action based
on this comment.

Request To Add Removal Requirement

Ralph Isaacson stated that the laser etching, which identifies the
manufacturer and serial number, is eventually worn off by environmental
conditions, usage, and age.
The commenter stated that in some instances the pitot probes will
require removal from the fuselage to clearly identify the mechanically
stamped serial number at the inner base of the probe.
The commenter requested that a requirement for removing the pitot
probes in order to identify the overhauled pitot probes serial numbers
should be added to the final rule AD action.
We partially agree with the commenter. We agree with the
possibility that the serial number may not be legible on the outside of
the pitot probe because of environmental conditions, usage, age, etc.
However, we disagree with adding a requirement to remove the pitot
probe during every inspection. If the serial number is legible from the
outside of the pitot probe, this may add an unnecessary burden to the
operators. Also, some operators are capable of positively identifying
the serial number of the affected pitot probe and the repair date from
a review of maintenance records. We have not changed this AD action
based on this comment.

Conclusion

We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM.
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD affects 679 products installed on
airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

Estimated Costs

We estimate the following costs to do any necessary replacements
that will be required based on the results of the inspection. We have
no way of determining the number of airplanes that might need these
replacements:

On-Condition Costs

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the
Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by
FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is
normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but
during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the
authority to issue ADs applicable to small airplanes, gliders,
balloons, airships, domestic business jet transport airplanes, and
associated appliances to the Director of the Policy and Innovation
Division.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):